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CULTURE AND COMPETITION:

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS
Ki Jong Lee*

INTRODUCTION

T

he lack of a competition culture has often been considered
the central impediment to promoting competition. I
However, the impact of citizens' values upon competition culture
has rarely been investigated. The values of a nation's citizens, or
a national culture, exert perpetual influence upon its competition
culture and competition policy. National culture differences may
substantially affect regional cooperation on competition policy.
This article attempts to establish a correlation between culture
and competition policy at both the national and regional level,
and illuminate its implications for regional competition
cooperation.
CULTURE AND COMPETITION: NATIONAL LEVEL

The weakness of a competition culture affects not only
developing countries or transition economies, but also developed
nations that have decades of experience in implementing
competition policies. In Japan, for example, the influence of the
* Associate Professor, College of Law, Sookmyung Women's University
B.L., M.L., Ph.D. Yonsei University. The author gratefully acknowledges
Stephen J. Choi, Eleanor M. Fox, Andrew I. Gavil, David J. Gerber, Joseph
Seon Hur, Amir N. Licht, Russell W. Pittman, Randolph W. Tritell and
Spencer Weber Waller for their invaluable advice and encouragement. He also
wishes to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola Consumer Law Review for
their great efforts.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"),
Challenges/Obstacles Faced by Competition Authorities in Achieving Greater
Economic Development Through the
Promotion of Competition
(CCNM/GF/COMP(2003)6) at 2 (2003).
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traditional harmonization culture, the preference for stability,
and the past memory of economic success hinder people from
accepting the new culture of competition. 2 Even among
European nations the strength of a competition culture varies: the
U.K. and Ireland are building up a stronger competition culture
with a drive for rigorous criminal enforcement against cartels,
while most others hesitate.3
This article designates national culture differences as an
underlying cause of such diversity in competition culture. By
measuring and comparing national cultures, cross-cultural
psychology helps us verify their impact upon competition cultures
and competition policies.
MEASURING AND COMPARING NATIONAL CULTURES

Cross-cultural psychologists developed a framework to
compare national cultures, or the values of nations' citizens, on a
statistical basis and on a global scale: the Cultural Value
Dimension (CVD) framework. It provides us with a world map
of cultural values and enables us to locate competition policies on
it, so that we can compare national cultures and competition
policies on a global scale.4 Among other scholars, Geert Hofstede
identified five independent dimensions of national culture
differences as follows:'
2 Akinori Uesugi, How Japan is Tackling Enforcement Activities Against

Cartels, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 349, 353-56

(2005).

3 Criminalizing cartel conduct may conflict with existing social and legal

norms within a jurisdiction. See, e.g., OECD, HARD CORE CARTELS: RECENT
PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD at 23 (2003). Thus OECD recommends
that countries should consider introducing and imposing criminal sanctions
against individuals involved in cartels, "where it would be consistent with
social and legal norms." OECD, Hard Core Cartels: Third Report on the
Implementation of the 1998 Recommendation at 40 (2005) [hereinafter OECD,
Third Report].
I Many disciplines, such as management and international accounting,
have fruitfully applied the framework in dealing with different cultures, and
this is not unprecedented in the legal discipline. See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase,
Legal Processes and National Cultures, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. i
(1997) (applying the framework to the civil procedure systems of the US and
Germany); see also, Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies:
Toward a Cross-CulturalTheory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 147 (2001) (demonstrating the correlation between CVDs and
corporate governance laws).
I This article uses Hofstede's framework mainly because of the
importance of the Uncertainty Avoidance Index in comparing antitrust
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I) Power Distance ("PDI"): "The extent to which the less
powerful members of institutions and organizations within
a country expect and accept that power is distributed
unequally."6
Uncertainty Avoidance ("UAI"): "The extent to which
the members of a culture
feel threatened by uncertain or
7
unknown situations.
2)

3) Individualism/Collectivism ("IDV"): "Individualism
stands for a society in which the ties between individuals
are loose: Everyone is expected to look after him/herself
and her/his immediate family only. Collectivism stands
for a society in which people from birth onwards are
integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which
throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in
exchange for unquestioning loyalty."8
4) Masculinity/Femininity ("MAS"): "Masculinity stands
for a society in which social gender roles are clearly
distinct: Men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and
focused On material success; women are supposed to be
more modest, tender and concerned with the quality of
life. Femininity stands for a society in which social gender
roles overlap: Both men and women are supposed to be
modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life." 9
5) Long-term/Short-term Orientation ("LTO"): "Long
Term Orientation stands for the fostering of virtues
oriented
towards
future rewards,
in
particular,
perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole, Short Term

policies. Another prominent cross-cultural psychologist, Shalom H. Schwartz,
lists three similar value types in his framework: Embeddedness/Autonomy,
Hierarchy/ Egalitarianism and Mastery/Harmony. Shalom H.Schwartz, A
Theory of Cultural Values and Some Implications for Work, 48 APPL'D
PSYCHOL. INT'L REV. 23, 26-28 (I999). His project covers more countries than
that of Hofstede. Licht, supra note 4, at 174.
GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURES' CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES,
BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 98 (2d ed.
2003).
6

Id. at 161.
8 Id.

at 225.

Id. at 297.
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Orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to
the past and present, in particular, respect for tradition,
preservation of 'face' and fulfilling social obligations." ' 10
Based upon the data collected within the subsidiaries of
IBM in 72 countries using more than ii6,ooo questionnaires
between 1967 and 1973, Hofstede categorized 50 countries and
three regions (Arab countries, East Africa and West Africa) along
the five cultural value dimensions. His research not only shows
us the index scores and ranks for countries and regions
concerning each dimension," but also clusters the 53 countries
and regions into i2 branches using a hierarchical cluster
analysis. 12 Later, additional data were collected from other
countries unrelated to IBM, and Hofstede estimated index scores
for i6 countries from that data."3
THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CULTURES UPON COMPETITION
POLICIES: THE EXAMPLE OF CARTELS

This article assumes that national culture differences are
at least partly responsible for the differences in countries'
competition policies. The dissimilarity in the rigor of anti-cartel
policy among nations could exemplify such a correlation.
Despite the broadening consensus against hardcore cartels,
the rigor of anti-cartel enforcement varies widely among nations.
According to an OECD report, less than half of its member
countries provide for the imposition of fines on natural persons
involved in cartels: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland,
Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Slovak Republic,
Spain and the U.S. 4 It lists only nine member countries that
provide for the imprisonment of natural persons involved in
cartels: Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico,

10Id. at 359.
11HOFSTEDE, CULTURES' CONSEQUENCES, supra note 6 at 5oo, Exhibit

A5. i.

12 Id. at 62. This was done without consulting the LTO that was adopted
later than the other four dimensions after the survey of Chinese culture. See id.
at 69-7I Concerning the process of adding the fifth dimension.
'3 See id. at 502, Exhibit A5. 3 for the summary of the results.
OECD, Fighting Hard-Core Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanctions and
Leniency Programmes at 82 (2002) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/

41/44/184189i.pdf.
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Norway, Slovak Republic and the U.S.15 The U.K. recently
introduced criminal sanctions, including long jail sentences for
16
cartel conduct.
The report also says that only a few nations have actually
imposed fines upon natural persons (Australia, Canada,
Germany, Ireland and the U.S.), and that only two countries have
sent executives involved in cartels to jail (Canada and the U.S.). 7
Recently, the U.K. prosecuted executives for engaging in cartels, 8
and .Ireland imposed criminal sanctions upon executives
(including a custodial sentence upon their ring leader) for cartel
conduct." '

To identify the cultural value dimensions that are
responsible for the differences in nations' anti-cartel policies, let
us first look over the CVD indexes of the U.S., the country most
active in imposing criminal sanctions for cartel conduct.
According to Hofstede's research, the U.S. ranks high in IDV
(1/53) and MAS (15/53), and ranks low in PDI (38/53), UAI (43/53)
and LTO (27/34).20 From these ranks this article draws a pair of
hypotheses: (i) the combination of highs and lows in the CVD
ranks similar to that of the U.S. is correlated with rigorous anticartel policies; and (ii) the CVD in which the US ranks highest
(IDV) has a positive correlation with the rigor of anti-cartel
policies, while the CVD in which the US ranks lowest (UAI) has a
negative correlation. 2'
Is Id.
16 See

Julian

M. Joshua

and

Donald

C.

Klawiter,

The

UK

"Criminalization"Initiative, i6 ANTITRUST 67, 72 (Summer 2002)(The UK's
criminalization initiative raised concern on possible policy conflict within the
EU). See also, OECD, Third Report, supra note 3, at 28 (noting that two
countries are either expected to adopt criminal sanctions system soon
(Australia) or examining the proposal for criminalization of cartel conduct
(Sweden)).
' OECD, FightingHard-Core Cartels, supra note 14, at 83-84.
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Net Tightens Around Anti-Competitive
Behavior (2oo6), available at www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2oo6/
14912.pdf.

"9McCann FitzGerald, First Criminal Convictions for Cartel Offences,
http://www.mccannfitzgerald.ie/PublicAccess/eZineView-eZineFullText.asp
?cntr= i&groupguid=6oFF89A9-7B95-4662-ABEi-61D8D82AD76o&eZineID
1169&TitleID=158&issue=2.
20 As LTO was added later than other 4 CVDs, Hofstede's research of the
5th CVD covers only 34 countries and regions. See generally, HOFSTEDE,
CULTURES' CONSEQUENCES, supra note 6.
2 The second hypothesis seems quite coherent with the definition of both
CVDs quoted above: cartels are definitely a collective phenomenon, even
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We could easily find the countries with the combination of
CVD ranks similar to that of the U.S. in the 8th of Hofstede's 12
clusters. The so called "Anglo cluster" includes Australia, the
U.S., Canada, Great Britain, Ireland and New Zealand. Also,
among the 9th branch countries, Germany and South Africa
show similar combinations. 3
For easier comparison of the ranks of countries in IDV
and UAI, this article simply adds the UAI rank of each country to
its reverse rank in IDV to create the new "U-I" index, with
apologies to cross-cultural psychologists.
According to this
hypothesis, U-I should have a positive correlation with the rigor
of anti-cartel policies. The nations ranked in the top ten in U-I
are Great Britain, the U.S., Denmark, Sweden, Canada, Ireland,
Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Jamaica.14 It is

worth noting that all the Anglo cluster countries rank above 8th
in U-I; and Germany (17th) and South Africa (13 th), which have
a combination of CVD ranks similar to that of the U.S., also rank
fairly high.
Of the 14 countries noted above that provide for
imposition of fines on natural persons, seven show a combination
of CVD ranks similar to that of the U.S.: Australia, Canada,
Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S. itself. Six
belong to the Anglo cluster and are ranked within the top eight in
U-I, and two rank fairly high in U-I: Norway (iith) and
Germany (17th).

Five (Canada, Germany, Ireland, the U.K. and the U.S.) of
the ten countries with imprisonment provisions for cartel conduct
show a combination of CVD ranks similar to that of the U.S.
Four belong to the Anglo cluster and are ranked within the top
six in U-I, and two (Germany and Norway) rank fairly high in UI.
If we turn our attention from the adoption to the
implementation of anti-cartel provisions, the correlations get
much closer. Each of the five countries (Australia, Canada,
Germany, Ireland and the U.S.), that actually imposed fines on
natural persons for cartel conduct, shows a combination of CVD
ranks similar to that of the U.S. Four belong to the Anglo cluster

though they do not involve a lifelong relationship such as family; cartels are
inclined to reduce the uncertainty that competitive process provides.
22 HOFSTEDE, CULTURES' CONSEQUENCES,
23

24

Id.
See Appendix.

supra note 6, at 62.
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and rank above 7th in U-I, and one (Germany) ranks fairly high
(17th) in U-I. Further, all three countries (Canada, Ireland and
U.K.) that imposed imprisonment upon executives involved2 in
cartels belong to the Anglo cluster, and rank above 5th in U-I.

1

Using less technical terms, we could sum up the findings
above as follows:
i) Nations with individualistic values are likely to have a
more rigorous anti-cartel policy than those with
collectivist ones;
Nations with high tendency to avoid uncertainty are
inclined to have a relatively lax anti-cartel policy;
2)

3) Nations that show the combination of cultural values
similar to those of the U.S. tend to have a more rigorous
anti-cartel policy;
4) Anglo cluster countries (the U.S., Canada,. U.K.,
Ireland, Australia and -New Zealand) tend to have
relatively rigorous anti-cartel policies.
As cartels directly restrain competition and are major
targets of competition policy, we could infer that a lax anti-cartel
policy indicates a relatively weak competition culture, while a
rigorous one manifests a stronger competition culture.
It should be noted, however, that culture is not the only
Legal and institutional
factor affecting anti-cartel policies.
factors, such as the substantive or procedural characteristics of
nations' administrative and/or criminal laws, could also seriously
affect anti-cartel enforcement. Although the impact of cultural
factors seems undeniable, we must conduct research on a globalscale to fully demonstrate the culture-competition policy
correlations.26 The full-scale research will require the cooperation
of economists, econometricians and cross-cultural psychologists
as well as legal scholars. Cooperation among legal scholars is
addition, Australia, which is expected to adopt criminal sanctions for
cartels soon, also belongs to Anglo cluster. See OECD, Third Report, supra
note 3 at 28. And Sweden, which is examining the proposal for criminalization
of cartel conduct, ranks very high (4 th) in U-I. Id.
26 We could also test the robustness of above results by applying the
framework of Shalom H. Schwartz, another prominent cross-cultural
psychologist. See Schwartz, supra note 5 (creating a similar framework).
25 In
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essential to get beyond the formal language of statutes.
Economists could help develop economic indexes that could
measure the performance of antitrust policies.2 7 Econometricians
could help describe the correlation between cultures and antitrust
policies in numeral letters, and identify the relative importance of
national cultures vis-?i-vis other factors that also affect
competition policies. Finally, cross-cultural psychologists could
help update nations' CVD indexes through new surveys, and
develop new CVD indexes that fit our specific need of comparing
cultures and competition policies.
Lacking the resources to support full-scale research, this
2 8
article demonstrates the propositions rather impressionistically.
The aim of this incomplete demonstration is to invoke the need
for full-scale research rather than to jump to conclusions without
sufficient proof.
CULTURE AND COMPETITION: REGIONAL LEVEL

HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED

If it is true that a national culture has a close correlation
with its competition policy, such correlation should also assert
itself in the contacts between nations in regional cooperation on
competition policy. This article tries to establish the culturecompetition policy correlations on a regional level by analyzing
the prevalence of each type of competition-related provision
("CRP") in regional trade agreements ("RTA"s) with the CVD
framework of cross-cultural psychology. However, readers are
cautioned here that this approach has three methodological
limitations that constrain the ability to address the issue.
27

See generally, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2005-20o6:

POLICIES UNDERPINNING RISING PROSPERITY, (Augusto Lopez-Claros et al.
eds., World Economic Forum, Pelgrave McMillan 2005); Office of Fair
Trading, Guidelines for Competition Assessment: A Guide for Policy Makers
Completing Regulatory Impact Assessments
(2002),
available at
http://oft.gov.uk; THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT (2OOI) available at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/2ooi/content.htm (Chapter 3 contains
the cross-country survey of the effectiveness of legal systems); Mark A. Dutz &
Maria Vagliasindi, Competition Policy Implementation in Transition
Economy: An Empirical Assessment, European Bank, Working Paper, No. 47
(i999).
28 Due to the lack of econometric tools and quantifiable data on anti-cartel
policies, this article could only discern the most obvious correlations. Full-scale
research could reveal subtler correlations between national cultures and
competition policies, such as those within clusters other than Anglo.
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First, lacking econometric tools and quantifiable data on
regional competition cooperation, this article could not show the
relative importance of cultural factors vis-&-vis other factors that
affect regional competition cooperation, such as the international
interests and objectives of the parties and the extent of their
willingness to undertake international obligations constraining
their room to maneuver. 29 Again, invoking the need for full-scale
research, this article presents an outline of the issue.
Second, the areas that should be covered by
comprehensive research on the issue are exceedingly wide, and
less than comprehensive research could draw misleading
conclusions on imperfect information. For example, numerous
competition
mechanisms for regional and international
cooperation exist, including RTAs, bilateral antitrust cooperation
agreements, case-by-case cooperation and soft mechanisms such
as the International Competition Network. The U.S. prefers
other choices to RTAs, as it does not regard the latter as an
optimal tool for promoting and enforcing competition policy. Its
RTAs often omit entire CRPs or only contain relatively weak
ones.
Thus, insofar as the U.S. is concerned, competition
chapters in RTAs might not be a good indicator of culturecompetition policy correlation on a regional level.
Third, Hofstede's framework provides only the CVD
index scores of nations, not those of supranational entities, such
as the EU. As this article cannot estimate the CVD scores of the
EU as a whole from those of its member countries, it will not
elaborate on the cultural implications of RTAs signed by the EU.
Doing so will require either the interdisciplinary cooperation of
psychologists and econometricians, or a whole new survey based
on entirely different methodologies.
As cultural differences may account for the differences in
competition policies, the bigger the national culture differences
between the parties are, the narrower the room for compromise
could get. This article assumes that RTAs among nations with
similar cultures tend to have relatively stronger CRPs, while
those among different-cultured nations are likely to have weaker
ones.
The "stronger" CRPs are here initially defined as those

29 See

Spencer

Weber Waller, The International Harmonization of

Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U.L.REV. 343, 391-97 0997) (listing factors
affecting successful harmonization of antitrust rules, such as hegemony, deep
integration, and shared visions and values).
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that have relatively detailed substantive provisions, clauses
requiring serious commitment to cooperation (e.g. comity clauses)
and/or strong dispute settlement provisions (e.g. arbitration
clauses), while the "weaker" ones are those that do not. The
distinction between "stronger" and "weaker" CRPs will be further
refined in the process of analysis.
By appreciating the cultural similarity between the parties
of RTAs, this article notes that the countries within the same
branch, which Hofstede clustered according to their cultural
similarity, tend to have a similar competition culture, and that
the Anglo cluster countries are inclined to have a relatively strong
competition culture. It also notes that the countries with similar
U-I ranks are likely to have similar competition cultures.
THE CULTURAL IMPLICATION OF THE PREVALENCE OF
EACH TYPE OF COMPETITION PROVISION IN REGIONAL

TRADE AGREEMENTS

A recent OECD study presents a useful taxonomy to
classify selected RTAs and the type of CRPs they contain, 0 and
thus helps us demonstrate a correlation between national cultures
and competition policies on a regional level. This article will
follow in its footsteps, looking for evidence that supports the
culture-competition policy correlations in regional competition
cooperation. 3

30 Oliver Solano & Andreas Sennekamp, Competition Provisions in
Regional Trade Agreements (OECD Trade Policy Working Papers, No. 31, 7-9,

2oo6),

available at

http://miranda.sourceoecd.org/vl=20784531cl=Ii/nw=I/

rpsv/cgi-bin/wppdf?file=519tov5qk4ro.pdf (The study sorts the CRPs of 86
RTAs into eight categories as follows: (a) adopting, maintaining and applying
competition measures; (b) coordination and cooperation; (c) provisions
addressing anti-competitive behavior; (d) competition-specific provisions
concerning non-discrimination, due process, transparency; (e) exclusion of
antidumping; (f) recourse to trade measures; (g) dispute settlement; (h)
flexibility and progressivity (special and differential treatment). See also
UNCTAD, A Presentationof Types of Common Provisions to Be Found in
International,ParticularlyBilateral and Regional, Cooperation Agreements on
Competition Policy and Their Application (ED/RBP/CONF.6/ 3 ) (2005)
(providing a useful analysis of the main types of CRPs contained in selected
RTAs and agreements on competition law enforcement).
3' For the sake of clarity this article will focus on the categories that show
the most distinct feature in their prevalence among RTAs.
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THE "EC-STYLE" AGREEMENTS AND THE "NORTH AMERICAN
SYLE" AGREEMENTS

The OECD study distinguishes two "families" of
agreements: the North American style agreements that focus
more on coordination and cooperation provisions, and the ECstyle agreements that are oriented towards rather substantive
rules.12 We could characterize the former as having weaker CRPs
and the latter as having stronger, as it is generally more difficult
to reach an agreement on substantive rules than on
cooperation/coordination clauses. The study also identifies some
agreements that have the characteristics of both "families" (e.g.
Chile-Korea, EC-Chile, EC-Mexico, Korea-Singapore). 1 We
could describe them as having stronger CRPs as well.
Among the 86 RTAs analyzed in the OECD study, 9
agreements were concluded between Anglo cluster countries and
those without (Australia-Singapore, Australia-Thailand, CanadaChile, Canada-Costa Rica, Chile-US, NAFTA, New ZealandSingapore, Singapore-US and TPSEPA34).3 1 Most focus more on

cooperation/coordination provisions and could be grouped into
North American style agreements, which are characterized as
having weaker CRPs. Only three have the characteristics of both
"families" and could be characterized as having stronger CRPs
(Australia-Thailand, Canada-Costa Rica 36 and TPSEPA).
32

Solano & Sennekamp, supra note 3o, at 15. Note that this distinction

does not operate with clearly delineated categories but with flexible "families,"
and that, despite the denominations, the EC or a North American country is
not a member of every agreement in each family. Rather the majority of RTAs
analyzed in the OECD study do not involve EU or the U.S. In so far as EU or
the U.S. is concerned, a "legal experience perspective" could also help us
account for the divergence. See also David J. Gerber, The U.S.-European
Conflict over the Globalization of Antitrust Law: A, Legal Experience
Perspective, 34 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 123 (i999) (different legal experience leads
EU toward convergence and US toward cooperation).
" Solano & Sennekamp, supra note 30, at i5.
34 TPSEPA is the acronym of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership Agreement between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore,
which entered into force on May i, 2006.
11 Agreements involving EC and EEA are excluded here, even if the U.K.
and Ireland are their members. As noted above, the U.K. and Ireland seem to
belong to a different category of competition culture than most of the other
European countries.
36 Solano & Sennekamp, supra note 30, at I7 (The Canada-Costa Rica
agreement goes deeper and further than the others in most aspects of CRPs).
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On the other hand, most of the 75 RTAs concluded
between countries outside the Anglo cluster could be classified as
EC-style agreements with stronger CRPs. Only a few have the
characteristics of both families and could be characterized as
having stronger CRPs (Algeria-EC, CariCom, Chile-EC, ChileKorea etc.).
Two agreements were concluded within the Anglo cluster.
One is a North American style agreement (Australia-US), and the
other displays characteristics of both families (ANZCERTA, i.e.
Australia-New Zealand). The parties to the latter have more
similar U-I ranks than those to the former."
In summation, RTAs outside the Anglo cluster tend to be
EC-style agreements, which could be characterized as having
stronger CRPs, while RTAs between Anglo cluster countries and
those without are likely to be the North American style
agreements, which could be characterized as having weaker
CRPs. Also, within the Anglo cluster, the RTAs between
countries with relatively similar cultures have stronger CRPs.
COOPERATION

The OECD study subdivides the coordination and
cooperation provisions of CRPs in RTAs into six subcategories:
general cooperation provision, notification, consultation on
or its enforcement, negative comity, and
competition policy
38
positive comity.

cooperation/coordination
We could characterize the
provisions that contain negative and/or positive comity clauses as
"stronger," while those that do not as "weaker," as the former
require more serious commitment to cooperation.39
Only nine of the 86 RTAs analyzed contain comity clauses
3'See Waller, supra note 29, at 356-57 ("The developments in Australia
and New- Zealand are gaining greater appreciation in the United States
through the work of writers such as Rex Ahdar and Maureen Brunt, who have
revealed their importance and the frustrating possibility that they may be
unique and non-transferable to other cultural, economic, historical, and
geographic settings.").
38 Solano & Sennekamp, supra note 3o, at 7.
Specific obligations relating to negative and positive comity are often
thought as 'deeper' forms of inter-agency cooperation on competition policy.
Simon J. Evenett, What Can We Really Learn From the Competition
Provisions of Regional Trade Agreements? In COMPETITION PROVISIONS IN
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: HOW TO ASSURE DEVELOPMENT GAINS 41

(Philippe Brusik et al. eds., UNCTAD, 2005).
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(Algeria-EC, CariCom, Chile-EC, Chile-Korea, EC-South Africa,
EC-Mexico, EFTA-Mexico, EEA, Japan-Mexico). Five include
EC, EEA or EFTA as a signatory, while none include Anglo
cluster countries (even ANZCERTA, an agreement within the
cluster, omits comity clauses).4" Therefore we could infer that
European countries (excluding the U.K. and Ireland) are more
inclined to adopt comity clauses, i.e. "stronger" cooperation
provisions, in their CRPs than Anglo cluster countries.
Two of the agreements with comity provisions involve
countries with very similar U-I ranks, i.e., countries with very
similar cultural values regarding the Individualism/Collectivism
and the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension (Chile-Korea and
Japan-Mexico). One involves countries that belong to the same
branch under Hofstede's classification based on their cultural
similarity (Chile-Korea). Thus, we could say that countries with
very similar cultures at times adopt comity clauses in their CRPs.
PROVISIONS ADDRESSING ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR

The OECD study subdivides anticompetitive behavior
provisions into 5 subcategories: anticompetitive agreements;
monopolization or abuse of a dominant position (ADP);
anticompetitive mergers; state aid or subsidies; state monopolies
and state enterprises.4 1 From our cultural point of view two of
them show distinct features in their prevalence among RTAs:
anticompetitive agreement clauses and monopolization/ADP
clauses.
Anticompetitive agreement clauses are omitted in only i6
of the RTAs analyzed.
Among the 70 RTAs containing
anticompetitive agreement clauses, 6i were concluded outside the
Anglo cluster. Among the i6 RTAs omitting anticompetitive
agreement clauses, 7 involve Anglo cluster countries (AustraliaSingapore, Australia-US, Canada-Chile, Chile-US, NAFTA,
New Zealand-Singapore and Singapore-US). Only four among
the i i RTAs involving Anglo cluster countries contain
anticompetitive agreement clauses (ANZCERTA, AustraliaThailand, Canada-Costa Rica and TPSEPA)
40 Note, however, that bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements between
Anglo cluster countries often contain comity clauses (e.g. US-Australia, USCanada).
41 Solano & Sennekamp, supra note 30, at 7-8.'
42 Within the Anglo cluster, the RTA between relatively similar-cultured
nations has anticompetitive agreement clauses (ANZCERTA), while that
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Monopolization/ADP clauses are omitted in only five
among the 86 agreements analyzed. Three of those five RTAs
involve Anglo cluster countries (ANZCERTA, AustraliaSingapore and New Zealand-Singapore). Among the four RTAs
agreement
clauses
and
omitting
both
anticompetitive
monopolization/ADP clauses, 2 involve Anglo cluster countries
(Australia-Singapore and New Zealand-Singapore).
In sum, RTAs outside the Anglo cluster tend to contain
anticompetitive agreement clauses, while those within the cluster
are more
inclined
to contain
do
not; the
former
monopolization/ADP clauses than the latter.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

The OECD study subdivides dispute settlement (DS)
provisions into three subcategories: exclusion of competitionrelated matters from the agreement-specific dispute settlement
mechanism; consultations; and arbitration. 3 This article regards
arbitration clauses as a characteristic of the "stronger" type of DS
mechanism, 44 while it regards clauses excluding RTA-specific DS
as a characteristic of the "weaker" one.
Among the 25 RTAs containing arbitration clauses,. ii
involve EC or EFTA, while only one involves an Anglo cluster
country (New Zealand-Singapore). 4
Among the i9 RTAs
containing clauses excluding RTA-specific DS, nine involve
Anglo cluster countries.46 Among the i i RTAs involving Anglo
cluster countries, only two omit clauses excluding RTA-specific
We could
DS (ANZCERTA and New Zealand-Singapore).
therefore infer that RTAs involving Anglo cluster countries tend
to contain clauses excluding RTA-specific DS and omit
arbitration clauses, and could be described as having a tendency
to contain "weaker" CRPs.
Again we could quite clearly discern the culture-

between different-cultured nations does not (Australia-US).
Solano & Sennekamp, supra note 30, at 8.
"Arbitration permits the parties to obtain an enforceable award that
cannot be guaranteed through consultation. Id. at 14.
45 The OECD study also notes that arbitration generally occurs in ECstyle and EFTA-style agreements rather than in North American style
agreements. Solano & Sennekamp, supra note 30.
46 Note that three RTAs involving Anglo cluster countries contain clauses
that partially exclude RTA-specific DS (Australia-US, Chile-US and
Singapore-US). Id.
'3
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competition policy correlation on regional level. Major findings
on this point are as follows:
i) RTAs within the same branch of countries are inclined
to have relatively strong CRPs;
RTAs between Anglo cluster countries and those
without are likely to have weaker CRPs, while RTAs
outside the cluster tend to have stronger ones;
2)

3) RTAs between countries that are similar in their
Individualism/Collectivism index and/or Uncertainty
Avoidance Index are apt to have relatively strong CRPs.
PROMOTING COMPETITION CULTURE: NATIONAL AND
REGIONAL LEVELS

Before striving to formulate measures to promote
competition culture, one thing should be noted: ironing out
national culture differences is neither possible nor desirable.
National cultures are perceived as extremely stable." We could
only try to enhance competition-friendly values among citizens.
We could not put one culture above another, as we have no
criteria available for that sort of judgment. Even though Anglo
cluster countries could be said to have a relatively strong
competition culture, this does not always mean that they have a
Like diversity in
better or superior competition culture.
cultural diversity
regimes,
different
policies
among
competition
should also create opportunities for legal innovation and
change.4 8 Given the evolutionary nature of competition laws,
According to Hofstede, "Culture change basic enough to invalidate the
country dimension index scores will need either a much longer period -say, 50
to ioo years - or extremely dramatic outside events." HOFSTEDE, supra note 6,
at 36. However, despite ongoing debates, the supporters of culturedevelopment correlations have spurred on their efforts to flesh out the
guidelines for progressive cultural change. E.g., Lawrence E. Harrison,
PromotingProgressive Cultural Change, in CULTURE MATTERS: How VALUES
SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS, 296 (Samuel P. Huntington and Lawrence E.
Harrison, ed., 2001).
" See John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of International
Antitrust Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549, 563-64 (2003) ("...the
different rules operating within a. diversified regime may move to a more
optimal level by virtue of their very diversity because diversity creates
opportunity for legal innovation and change."). The most radical measures to
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cultural diversity could also enhance the process of convergence.49
For example, the U.S. got inspiration from Europe and Japan in
adopting the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, which
requires rule of reason analysis for research joint ventures. 0 In
comparison with the U.S., Europe and Japan could accept more
easily the notion of pro-competitive cooperation among
competitors due to their relatively collectivist cultures; and the
intercultural contact with the EC and Japan helped the U.S. to
reinvigorate5 1 the spirit of cooperation in its antitrust policy.
PROMOTING NATIONAL COMPETITION CULTURE

Nations often adopt competition laws that are inconsistent
with their citizens' cultural values, and therefore have difficulty
implementing them. Of course, even the U.S.. has some difficulty
implementing its antitrust laws. For instance, business people do
not always feel guilty about price fixing." This kind of difficulty,
however, could be much more serious in a different cultural
context. In countries with collectivist values and/or a high
tendency to avoid uncertainty, competition authorities might
have more difficulties in persuading people that cartels are bad.
The cultural values of citizens could affect the performance of
leniency programs to a certain extent. In a culture that regards a
cartel as a form of cooperation rather than a conspiracy or crime,
an informer is nothing but a betrayer.
If cartels are not
promote innovation among regulators through increased competition has been
suggested in connection with securities regulation: Stephen Choi and Andrew
Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the Reach of U.S. Securities
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359

(1998); Stephen Choi, Law, Finance and Path Dependence: Developing Strong
Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657 (2002).
49 See Kevin J. O'Connor, Federalist Lessons for InternationalAntitrust
Convergence, 70 ANTITRUST LJ. 413, 429-30 (2002) ("...given the evolutionary
nature of antitrust law, the ability of antitrust jurisdictions to allow for
development of antitrust principles, as applied to the facts of particular cases,
is critical to our ability to achieve meaningful international convergence.").
SO Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and
Antitrust, 4 HIGH TECH. L. J. 1, 50 (1989).

51 On the American cultural tradition of cooperation, see Andrew I. Gavil,
Competition and Cooperation on Sherman Island: An Antitrust Ethnography,
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1225, 1235-47 0995).
52Cartels

often create sympathy or fellow-like feeling among participants
for successful conspiracy. See David Sally, Two Economic Applications of
Sympathy, i8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 455, 465-66 (2002).
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sanctioned severely enough due to the cultural resilience, only a
few will dare to be betrayers.5 3
So what shall we do? "Be patient." For most of the
countries in the world, competition laws came from abroad. 4
Moreover, if their cultural textures are not so competitionfriendly, they need time to adapt themselves to the foreign culture
of competition. Their antitrust laws might work quite differently
from their original prototype, especially during their initial stage
of development. Some countries might introduce alien elements
that are generally regarded as irrelevant to competition policies,
such as equality and discrimination, into their antitrust statutes.5
While these statutes or their implementation may look
unbalanced or wide of the mark at first glance, they could
substantially contribute to the citizens' adaptation to the foreign
culture of competition.
Besides patience, this article strongly suggests the need for
competition advocacy directly focusing on citizens' values. A
51 Mauro Grinberg, Deterring Cartels: The Brazilian Experience, Trends
and Possibilities, presented to the Global Competition Forum of the
International
Bar
Association
on
Business
Law/Mexican
Bar
Association/Federal Competition Commission (Mexico) Symposium, at 6 (June
26, 2003), available at http://www.araujopolicastro.com.br/download.asp?file
=MG-IBAMexico.doc; Rajan Dhanjee, The Tailoring of Competition Policy
to Caribbean Circumstances - Some Suggestions, Centre on Regulation and
Competition, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 79, at 11-12 (2004), available at
http://www.competition-regulation.org.uk/publications/working-papers/
WP79.pdf. It.'should be noted, however, that in the past few years many
jurisdictions have enacted leniency systems despite cultural resistance. In
Korea, business people are beginning to take leniency program seriously, as
both the burden of non-criminal fines against cartels and the benefits for
voluntary reporters (especially the "first in") increase substantially. The Korea
Fair Trade Commission reports two leniency cases in 2004 and ii in 2005.
Press release (written in Korean), available at http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/

2oo6o629_i00 9 27.hwp. These facts indicate that societal attitudes toward

leniency programs could be changed in a relatively short term. On the cultural
importance of antitrust enforcement in the U.S. that enables the leniency
program to function well, see W. Todd Miller, Whistleblowing on Conspiracies
and Cartels: Risks and Lessons from South (East?) of the Border, Victoria,
B.C. (April 24, 2001).
"' Canada's competition legislation preceded that of the US by a year. On
the indigenous roots of European competition laws, see DAVID J. GERBER,
LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING

PROMETHEUS (1998).

" Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law:
Lessons from and for South Africa and Indonesia, 41 HARV. INT'L L. J. 579
(2000).

LOYOLA CONSUMER LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 2 1:1I

nation could maximize citizens' receptiveness to competition
policy in the short term by aligning it with its culture.56 For
example, Korea put much more stress on economic concentration
and unfair business practices than cartels and mergers in its
earliest stages of competition law enforcement. As this line of
policy matched well with Korean culture, which attaches great
importance to the protection of the weak against the strong, 7 the
Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) gained powerful support
from the people. Owing to this public support, the KFTC was
able to vigorously step up its drive for anti-cartel enforcement.5 8
In the long run various measures could be taken to
encourage competition-friendly values.59 Before anything else,
nations could revive competition-friendly traditions in their own
history and thus facilitate a sense of historical continuity in
promoting competition. This revival need not be confined to the
tradition of marketplace competition: other relevant traditions
6 In designing regulation for nations, experts often take into account the

nation's industrial infrastructure. E.g., 'Russell Pittman, Chinese Railway
Reform and Competition: Lessons from the Experience in Other Countries, 38
J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL'Y 309 (2004). Likewise we could take into account
the cultural infrastructure of nations in designing antitrust policies.
11 Korea's low rank in the Masculinity/Femininity index ( 4 1 st) relates to
such inclination. See HOFSTEDE, supra note 6, at 317 (indicating that political
priority is likely to be given to solidarity with the weak rather than reward for
the strong in Feminine culture).
" Korea put in force the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act
(MRFTA) in i98i. During the first 13 years of its enforcement, the ratio of the
cases concerning improper concerted acts (cartels and cartel facilitators) to the
entire body of cases, in which KFTC used corrective measures against the
violations of MRFTA, was only i.o9%. The ratio, however, increased to 6.37%
by 2005. The statistics on the enforcement of MRFTA, written in Korean, are
These facts
available at http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/2oo6o6I3joo848.xls.
indicate that the sequence of policy introduction, rather than a one-time
snapshot, could have a close correlation with national cultures. Other
examples might be the countries that first introduced their competition laws
without merger control provisions, like Argentina, or those with relatively
weak competition laws, like Brazil.
" See Dhanjee, supra note 53, at 17-18 (it may be appropriate to focus on
"establishing legal and institutional mechanisms which.. .also promote longterm cultural change to make the culture more 'competition-friendly'."); see
also Grinberg, supra note 53, at 6-7 ("...in order to make antitrust law really
effective against cartels, a cultural and educational shock is necessary, starting
by the economic authorities but going all the way from the Government to the
business community."); Uesugi, supra note 2, at 356 ("The 'harmonization
culture' that dominated Japanese business thinking needed to experience
culture shock in order to accede to the new 'competition culture'.").
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could also help. Even the transition economies might be able to
find competition-friendly traditions in their history of communist
regimes.
As an example, the tradition of innovation and
cooperation could be found in most countries. They could revive
such tradition and help people to get familiar with the notion of
competition by focusing on the idea of "competition for
innovation," "innovation for competition" or "cooperation for
competition."
The keys to competition-friendly cultures could also be
found in literature, arts and popular culture. Missionaries of
competition culture need not be confined to competition
authorities: support from academic circles, non-governmental
organizations, and mass media is also essential.
PROMOTING REGIONAL COMPETITION CULTURE

We could apply similar measures in a regional setting.
Cultural common grounds could be explored for successful
cooperation on competition policy. In the short term, the parties
to an RTA could pursue stronger CRPs by focusing on the areas
where their cultural texture allows closer cooperation.
For
example, if the parties share highly collectivist values and a high
tendency to avoid uncertainty, they could pursue detailed
anticompetitive agreement clauses with emphasis on joint
ventures. When they share Feminine culture, they could seek
detailed substantive rules on monopolization or abuse of
dominant position. In the case that the parties' cultural values
are quite similar in many respects, they could also strive for
strong dispute settlement mechanisms. Also, in many cases the
special and differential treatment provisions could help bridge
the cultural as well as the developmental gaps between the
parties.6" By consulting the CVD indexes of nations, we might be

60 On the competition-friendly elements in Marxist-Leninist views, see
Tibor Varady, The Emergence of Competition Law in (Former) Socialist
Countries, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 299-30 (1999). On the Russian tradition of
encouraging "socialist competition", see Kerry Ellen Pannell, Growth,
Stagnation, and Transition: Economic Implications of Soviet Ministerial

Organization,27 Bus. & ECON. HIST. 16, 18-19 (1998).
61 See Philippe Brusick and Julian Clarke, OperationalizingSpecial and
Differential Treatment in Cooperation Agreements on Competition Law and

Policy, in COMPETITION PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS:
HOW TO ASSURE DEVELOPMENT GAINS 176 (Philippe Brusik et al. ed., United

Nations 2005) ("At the bilateral or regional level, it might be easier for the
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able to identify culturally optimal regional competition policies.
In the long run nations might be able to close some
cultural gaps and pursue stronger CRPs if the parties to an RTA
could get the most out of their common cultural heritages and
popular cultural codes. As an example, China, Japan and Korea
62
show quite different degrees of tendency to avoid uncertainty.
However, they could find affluent traditions of innovation shared
in their histories, such as Confucian emphasis on renovation,
which are familiar to their citizens. Innovation-friendly elements
could also be found in popular culture, such as Hallyu (Korean
Wave) dramas, which are commanding general popularity across
Asia. By focusing on innovation-friendly traditions and cultural
codes, the Northeast Asian countries could help people to more
easily accept the uncertainties that the competitive process
provides. 3
CONCLUSION

Culture, of course, is not the only factor affecting
competition policies. Economic, political and institutional factors
often prevail, and outcomes deviate from the predictions based
on cultural considerations. Nevertheless, the impact of cultural
factors seems undeniable. By conducting full-scale research, we
might be able to identify the relative importance of national
cultures vis-dt-vis other factors in most areas of competition
policies, including mergers, 64 abuse of dominance6 5 and vertical
restraints. 66 If we could estimate the CVD index scores of

more-advanced party to accept a certain degree of flexibility, than they would
be prepared to accept at the multilateral level.").
62 Japan ranks 7t' and Korea 16-17' in the Uncertainty Avoidance index.
China was not covered by Hofstede's initial project, but he later estimated
China's UAI score as 3o; HOFSTEDE, supra note 6, at 502 Exhibit A5. 3 ; which
lies between those of Ireland (score 35, rank 47-48') and Hong Kong (score 29,
rank 49-5o').
63 On the importance of popular support for issues surrounding
international antitrust, see Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., The Global Antitrust
Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce or Runaway Regulation? 26

Fletcher F. World Aff. 59, 68

(2002).

4 Despite the recent development towards the convergence of merger
regulation, it seems hard to find any reason to believe that national cultures
will prove to be irrelevant.
65 Regarding abuse of dominance, it is quite probable that MAS index
scores will prove to be relevant.
66 Vertical restraints could be perceived as a form of cooperation in some
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supranational entities, such as the EU, we might be able to
elaborate on the cultural implications of their competition policies
at a regional level.
Further insight into the interaction between culture and
competition policy could help us to promote competition at both
the national and regional level. If all countries could draw on
competition-friendly traditions, and the intercultural contact
between nations could promote the innovation and convergence
of their competition policies, the conflict between competition
policies solely focusing on efficiency and consumer welfare and
those that do not could become far more tolerable.
We could also enhance international coordination of
competition policies by emphasizing cultural values such as
innovation and cooperation, which are closely related to
competition and could be shared by participating countries.
Even if it is hard to find the greatest common measure among
widely different cultures, we could still enlist the least common
denominator, a higher cultural value, to embrace all the
antagonistic values. In this way we could promote the one value
antitrust laws have pursued since their inception: progress.67

cultures, and incline to reduce the uncertainty that competitive process
provides. Thus IDV and UAI indexes could prove to be relevant.
67 See Gavil, supra note 5 1, at 1247-49. On the role of competition policies

in advancing the national economy and the global economy as a whole, see
Joseph Seon Hur, Capacity Building and Technical Assistance in the Area of
Competition Policy: Korea's Experiences and Suggestions, Address Before the
OECD/GFC (Mar. 18, 2002) (transcript available at http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/
20020214.doc). See also William J. Kolasky, The Role of Competition in
Promoting Dynamic Markets and Economic Growth, Address Before the
Tokyo America Center, Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 12, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2oo484.htm).
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APPENDIX
U-I Indext
Rank

Country or Region

Index

I

Great Britain
United States

98.5
96

2

Denmark

96

4

Sweden

93

5

Canada

91

6
7
8
9
1O

Ireland
Australia
New Zealand
Netherlands
Jamaica

89.5
89
87.5
84.5
8i

II

Norway

79

12

13

India
South Africa

78
77.5

14

Switzerland

73

15

Italy

70

16

Finland

68.5

17

Germany

68

18

Philippines
Singapore
Hong Kong
Malaysia
Iran
Austria
East Africa (region)
France
Arab Countries (region)
Israel
Belgium
Indonesia
West Africa (region)
Brazil

67
67
66.5
64
61.5

20
21
22
23
24

26
27

28
29

6o.5

56
56
54.5
54
50.5
48
48
48

* U-I Index is the sum of each country or region's UAI rank and its reverse

rank in IDV. When multiple countries rank the same in Hofstede's research,
the average of the upper next rank and the next lower rank is regarded as the
countries' rank. For instance, Brazil and Venezuela rank 2 1" together in UAI,
so their UAI rank is regarded as 21.5, the average of 20 and 23.
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32

Spain

46.5

33

Argentina

44

Thailand

44

35

Turkey

42.5

36
37

Mexico
Japan

40
37.5

38
39
40

Taiwan
Pakistan
Ecuador

36
31
30

41

Uruguay

42
43

Chile
Yugoslavia

29
28.5
28

44

Korea (South)

27.5

45
46

Venezuela
Greece

25.5
25

Columbia

25

48

Portugal

22

49
50

Costa Rica
Peru

20.5
18

5,

Salvador

17.5

52

Panama

5.5

53

Guatemala

4

